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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This contrast encapsulates the defining principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this aligns with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative stated this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This shift is consequential, but observers note it is early to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Friction

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Selective Action

A comparable confrontation flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.